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NORTH CAROLINA REVOLUTIONARIES IN ARMS:
THE BATTLE OF KING'S MOUNTAIN
ABSTRACT
This study details the accomplishments of the whig gentry of 
backcountry North Carolina during the American Revolution. During 
this time the backcountry was the scene of a savage civil war 
between whigs and tories. The region's whig leadership strove both 
to defeat the tories in a grueling guerilla war and at the same 
time to create a government that was capable of imposing order and 
stability on the area.
This study uses land claims, tax records, and census results 
that attest to the wealth and affluence of the whig leadership. 
Local court records demonstrate their political power and show the 
type of government they created in backcountry. Accounts of the 
war in backcountry North Carolina used in this study include those 
of participants and of neutral groups such as the Moravians. 
Letters and accounts by British officers attest to the effect of 
the whig victory on British strategy in the southern theater. 
Additionally, many secondary accounts of both backcountry life and 
the military struggle are drawn upon.
The whigs were victorious because their leaders were effective 
military men who successfully prevented the creation of any tory 
force capable of challenging their authority. They were also 
successful in establishing a government that offered war-weary 
backcountry citizens the promise of peace and stability. Their 
crowning achievement was their successful defence of the 
backcountry order they had created when they defeated Major Patrick
Ferguson at King's Mountain in 1780. This whig victory not only 
solidified their control over their own area, but forged the first 
link in a chain of events that would see the British driven out of 
the Carolinas to defeat at Yorktown.
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NORTH CAROLINA REVOLUTIONARIES IN ARMS 
THE BATTLE OF KING'S MOUNTAIN
2Introduction
Scholars of the American Revolution have long 
recognized the victory of frontier whigs at King's Mountain in 
1780 as an important step toward the defeat of the British in 
the South. Encouraged by Frederick Jackson Turner's popular 
thesis of Americanization occurring along the fringes of 
civilization, scholars attributed the victory to the 
individualistic backwoodsman who bested redcoats fighting with 
European tactics in the wilderness. Accounts of the battle 
emphasized the fact the frontier-wise whigs "hid behind rocks 
and trees" and fought in the same manner as Indians.1 Any 
contribution the "Over the Mountain Men" made to ultimate whig 
victory beyond their defeat of Ferguson went largely untold. 
Accounts told of "stalwart and hardy riflemen" who "crossed 
the wooded and precipitous defiles...to help their brethren on 
the plains" and then went back over the mountains, 
disappearing from the eyes of both enemies and historians.2
In more recent accounts, historians have been less 
romantic and have instead concentrated on placing the battle 
in its strategic context. Most note that the defeat 
represented the initial setback in a series of disasters that 
befell Cornwallis's army, culminating at Yorktown. But when 
the modern scholar concludes his account of the Battle of 
King's Mountain, the victors vanish once more behind the 
mountains and are not heard from again.3
Both old and more recent scholarship offer a less-than-
complete picture of both the importance of the battle and the 
men who fought it. The victorious whigs were not new entrants 
to the war in 1780. They had been fighting and winning a 
savage, backcountry, guerilla war since the war began. Their 
success in that struggle was instrumental in dampening 
loyalist enthusiasm in the North Carolina and Virginia 
Backcountry. So low were tory spirits that British Major 
Patrick Ferguson's expedition, which had recruitment as one of 
its key goals, rallied but a handful of men and was a failure 
long before his force was destroyed at King's Mountain.
There is no doubt that the victory at King’s Mountain 
stopped a series of whig reverses and shifted momentum in the 
contest for the South in favor of the whigs. What has been 
overlooked is how the outcome at King's Mountain destroyed the 
last, best chance that existed for loyalist victory in the 
Backcountry. Loyalist support was critical to the British 
strategy in the colonies. Thus, King's Mountain represented 
more than just a shift of momentum: Ferguson’s defeat
effectively ended British hopes for significant aid from the 
king's friends in the South, and thus dealt a crippling blow 
to Cornwallis' grand southern strategy.
Central to whig success in both the long-running struggle 
in the backcountry and the more dramatic battle at King's 
Mountain were the whig gentry along the frontier. They 
organized efforts to suppress tories, ran local governments, 
recruited men and raised money for the standing army and
provided a much-needed element of stability in the volatile 
backcountry. This thesis aims to explore the nature of the 
frontier gentry who comprised the whig leadership and to 
demonstrate their importance to the guerilla war along the 
frontier and the climactic victory of the backcountry whigs at 
King's Mountain.
The first chapter of this thesis is devoted to showing 
who the frontier gentry were and how they accomplished their 
goals. The second moves from an examination of the whigs as 
a group to a closer examination of two of their most prominent 
leaders, Benjamin Cleveland and William Campbell. Cleveland's 
and Campbell's careers vividly illustrate the nature of whig 
leadership in Revolutionary backcountry. The chapter 
concludes with an account of the crisis caused by Ferguson's 
invasion and the whig response.
Chapter I
The Frontier Gentry and the Revolution 
in the North Carolina Backcountry
The spring and summer of 1780 were high times for the 
king's friends in the South but bleak times for the whigs. 
The patriot cause, which had seemed so vital in the war's 
early days, now had about it the air of despair and defeat. 
The whigs had been sent reeling by a pair of devastating blows 
that had cost them their largest port and shattered their only 
standing army.
In February, British forces under the command of Major 
General Henry Clinton landed near Charleston, South Carolina. 
Clinton's goal was to gain a base of operations from which to 
launch a great campaign to pacify the South. His opponent, 
General Benjamin Lincoln, racked by doubts about the virtues 
of fighting or retreating, did neither. In May, Lincoln paid 
the price for his indecision when he was forced to surrender 
both the city, its port, and its irreplaceable 5,000-man 
garrison with hardly a struggle. Scarcely a month later, 
Clinton's replacement, Lord Charles Cornwallis, crushed the 
South's only standing army when the overconfident Horatio 
Gates attacked him at Camden, South Carolina. Having thus 
suffered two calamitous defeats, the stunned whigs could do 
little but harry Cornwallis's patrols and strike at his 
outposts. While the tattered remnants of Gates's command 
attempted to recover at a safe distance, Cornwallis could turn
6his attention to eradicating- the whigs from the southern 
colonies with confidence that his foes could do little to 
hinder him. As the year lengthened and summer* turned to 
autumn, there appeared to be little the almost prostrate whigs 
could do to halt, let alone reverse, the string of British 
successes.
In order to complete his subjugation of the South's 
rebels, Cornwallis ordered Major Patrick Ferguson and a force 
of approximately 1,000 men— mostly South Carolina loyalists 
along with a few New Yorkers— to march into western North 
Carolina "with directions to our friends there to take arms 
and assemble immediately, and to seize the most Violent People 
and all military Stores . . . and to intercept stragglers from 
the routed [American] army."4 Ferguson undertook his mission 
with zeal. Alhough his efforts to recruit loyalists met with 
little success, he nonetheless drove easily through the North 
Carolina piedmont, scattering token whig resistance and 
leaving a trail of burned farms in his wake. As he approached 
the mountains, Ferguson, warmed by his effortless march but 
frustrated by the lack of tory response, issued a proclamation 
to the settlers whose homes lay beyond the Blue Ridge: 
surrender immediately or your homesteads will be destroyed 
"with fire and sword."5 The proclamation elicited a response, 
but not the one Ferguson had hoped.
The "Over the Mountain Men"— Benjamin Cleveland, William 
Campbell, Isaac Shelby, John Sevier, the McDowell brothers and
other local leaders— had heard of Ferguson's destructive 
tactics and took his threat seriously. They quickly gathered 
a force of over 1,500 men and rode through the mountain passes 
to destroy his army before it reached their homes. They ran 
Ferguson's force to ground at King's Mountain, one of a small 
group of peaks along North Carolina's southern border. There 
the whigs killed or captured almost the entire loyalist force. 
In one blow, they gained for the patriot cause a much-needed 
victory and cast the first link in a chain of events that 
ensured the failure of Cornwallis's southern campaign.
King's Mountain was the crowning achievement of the "Over 
the Mountain Men," but it was by no means the first of their 
contributions to whig success. Years before Ferguson began 
his expedition, the backcountry whigs of North Carolina laid 
the foundation for their later victory by actively suppressing 
backcountry tories and winning over a large portion of the 
neutral population through their efforts to maintain public 
order.
Their theater of operations consisted mostly of North 
Carolina's Morgan District, comprising Burke, Lincoln, 
Rutherford, and Wilke3 counties. The area's central feature 
is the Blue Ridge chain that cut through the counties from 
northeast to southwest. The mountains were formidable 
obstacles. Moravian Bishop August Spangenberg aptly described 
the size and power of the Blue Ridge as "mountain to right and 
to left, before us and behind us, many hundreds of mountains,
8rising like great waves in storm."6 The lower slopes were 
thickly covered with chestnut, oak, and hickory trees. 
Vegetation along the crests varied: some of the mountains
were covered with "rhododendron hells," dense tangles of 
flowering plants that formed naturally impenetrable hedges, 
while others were "balds" that grew little but grass.
If such terrain was not an likely home for the weak or 
timid, the region's climate offered some compensations. There 
were some 200 frost-free days a year, with average 
temperatures of 58 to 60 degrees fahrenheit. Precipitation 
averaged between 48 and 50 inches a year. The combination of 
temperature and precipitation created conditions that, though 
not as conducive to farming as those of the tidewater, were 
nonetheless favorable to agriculture. In addition, the 
surrounding forests offered good hunting and large amounts of 
timber.7
Waterways are the second dominant geographical feature of 
the region. The Yadkin River flows eastward through the 
piedmont, while the Watauga, Nolachucky, and French Broad 
rivers flow to the west and feed into the Holston, which runs 
through what is now eastern Tennessee and follows a course 
roughly parallel to the mountains. Along these waterways, on 
both the eastern and western slopes of the mountains, North 
Carolina's backcountry settlers built their homes.
The settlers themselves were chiefly of English, Scots- 
Irish, or German descent. Most of them moved to the
backcountry because of the steeply rising price of land in 
settled areas to the east. The Scots-Irish settlers began 
to arrive from northern colonies, especially Pennsylvania, 
around 1750. Many German settlers also moved to North 
Carolina after first living in other colonies. Their chief 
route into the backcountry was the Great Wagon Road that 
extended from Philadelphia to the German Moravian community of 
Wachovia in eastern Surry County. From there, the road
splintered into several smaller branches that led deeper into 
the backcountry.
By the time the Seven Years' War began, the steady stream 
of migration, supplemented by direct immigration from Scotland 
and Ireland, turned into a flood of people moving into North 
Carolina's hinterland. Between 1750 and 1770, the colony's 
population tripled, with most of the growth occurring along 
the western frontiers.10 Benjamin Franklin estimated that
40,000 Pennsylvanians alone, drawn, by the lure of available 
land, migrated to North Carolina in the years immediately 
before the Seven Years' War, while the Connecticut Courant 
found the "rapid and sudden increase of inhabitants" in the 
North Carolina backcountry "surprising and astonishing."11
Life for the settlers was hard. In contrast to the large 
estates that dotted the Chesapeake and the tidewater, the most 
backcountry residents lived on small farms. Their houses were 
constructed of green logs chinked with clay and had clapboards 
roofs. Some were not even fully enclosed but had three walls
10
and roof with one side open to the elements. Furniture and 
utensils were crude— wooden bowls and cups, tables fashioned 
of split slabs, three-legged stools for seating, and straw 
mattresses for beds--and were lent a degree of permanence only 
by the presence of a piece or two or iron cookware and perhaps 
a few pewter spoons.12
Though some settlers led a hand-to-mouth existence by 
subsistence farming, many were able to grow food for sale and 
to supplement their incomes by hunting and trapping. Most 
owned a few head of cattle and perhaps a horse or a mule, but 
their cattle holdings paled beside those of tidewater 
inhabitants.13 Backcountry North Carolinians were able to 
export deerskins, foodstuffs, hemp, and herbs to the coastal 
region, which in turn shipped manufactured goods--especially 
cloth— as well as rum, sugar, and salt to the frontier.14 
Many of these trade goods were exported through the Moravian 
community at Salem, where during the 1760s it was common for 
wagons bearing between two and four tons of deerskins to 
lumber off toward Charleston and its distant markets.15
The deerskin-laden wagons were doubtless watched by the 
area's original inhabitants, the Cherokees, with more than a 
little resentment. They determined not to let their hunting 
grounds— the purportedly unoccupied land that had drawn the 
tide of settlers— go uncontested. Indian agent John Stuart 
had foreseen trouble when settlers originally pushed westward 
"as far back as the Mountains and deprived the Indians of the
11
Lower Cherokee Towns of the most valuable part of their 
hunting grounds." The Crown had spent far beyond its means to 
cleanse eastern North America of the French in the Seven
Years' War and had little stomach for the bill in blood or 
gold that war with France's former Indian allies would surely 
create. The settlers, however, had no such forebodings, and 
before the ink was dry on the Proclamation of 1763, its
articles prohibiting settlement in Indian lands west of the 
crest of the Blue Ridge were essentially dead letters. In 
defiance of both the royal ban and the menace posed by the 
area's Indian inhabitants, land-hungry colonists pushed over 
the mountains and began to settle along the rivers that ran
down the western slopes.
Stuart had his hands full preventing Cherokee
retaliation. He had, he wrote, experienced "much trouble by
the imprudent behaviour of our back Settlers behind this and 
other provinces."16 In spite of his best efforts, he was 
unable to prevent clashes between the opposing sides. An 
unforeseen consequence of the bitter frontier warfare was the 
emergence of a new, frontier elite who, having first won their 
spurs against the region's original inhabitants, went on to 
lead local whigs against their tory neighbors.
Power in eighteenth-century British America was based 
largely on social status and was maintained through political 
structures such as courts, legal strictures on voting, and by 
the deference of the populace, who more or less expected to be
12
led by their betters.17 Some frontier gentry were members of
leading tidewater families and had acquired frontier lands for
agriculture or for future speculation. Joseph Winston, a
native Virginian and cousin to Patrick Henry, was one of
these. Another was Joseph McDowell, who was born in
Winchester, Virginia, and moved to the backcountry when his
18father purchased a large section of land at Quaker Meadows.
The respect the populace showed men like Winston and McDowell
arose first from their wealth and position. Their political
connections to the governor and the colonial assembly allowed
them to gain control of the local courts, which in turn
allowed them to secure appointment to important local offices
19for themselves or their allies. The excesses some of these
local officials committed contributed to the rise of the
Regulator movement, a backcountry insurrection that climaxed
in 1771 with the Battle of Alamance Creek and the complete
20defeat of the Regulators.
The new gentry's origins were very different. Though 
backcountry political structures in North Carolina were 
similar to those on the coast, frontier notions of deference 
could differ sharply. Hunters and, to a lesser extent, 
surveyors, for example, could sometimes earn the respect and 
deference of the backcountry populace necessary to propel them 
into positions of leadership. Their trades, which often took 
them far beyond even the most outlying farmsteads, were 
fraught with danger from Indians and the elements. The
13
increased status that was granted to the successful hunter or 
surveyor could, if he met legal office-holding requirements, 
propel him into the frontier gentry class. Both Daniel Boone 
and Benjamin Cleveland, though later proved to be prodigious 
Indian fighters, first won acclaim on the frontier for their 
prowess as hunters. William Lenoir, Cleveland's chief
lieutenant, turned to surveying after he found that his meager 
teacher's salary was insufficient to support his family.21 
In addition to a good living by frontier standards, both 
trades offered the opportunity to view unsettled land long 
before other settlers could do so.
However much the backcountry settlers admired skillful 
hunters and surveyors, their constant dread of attack caused 
them to reserve their greatest respect for Indian fighters. 
Because of their skill as militia leaders, men of simple birth 
like Cleveland, Lenoir, Isaac Shelby, and John Sevier 
"invariably" came to hold the "highest civil and military 
offices of the western counties."22
The authority of the new gentry was not based on their 
leadership abilities alone. Strict property requirements for 
holding office applied to them just as to office holders 
elsewhere in the colony. The property requirements, whose 
centuries-old purpose was to keep political power concentrated 
in the hands of a small elite, did not prove an effective 
barrier to the emerging frontier gentry. Indeed, they usually 
acquired more than enough property to participate in ’local
14
government soon after their arrival in the mountains.
The new gentry's military prowess, in addition to winning
deference from the populace, could lead directly to the
acquisition of the land necessary for their new status.
Following the defeat of the Cherokees in 1776, in which
frontier gentry such as John Sevier, William Campbell, and
Benjamin Cleveland were instrumental,23 the Watauga
settlements were annexed by North Carolina and organized as
the Washington District. Cleveland was awarded almost 1,000
acres in the new district by the legislature--a sizable
2 4addition to his previous 1,300-acre holdings. Other leaders 
also profited in land through their involvement in repulsing 
the Cherokees: Campbell got a total of 354 acres in two
Washington District tracts, while Sevier received almost 
1 , 0 0 0 . 25 These additional lands served to increase the
gentry’s prestige and helped assure their continued viability 
within the political system in times of peace.
During the Revolution, the land holdings of prominent 
backcountry whigs grew at an astonishing pace. Cleveland 
added over 3,200 acres in Wilkes County to his holdings, while 
his younger brother Robert's property swelled by a more-than- 
respectable 666. At roughly the same time Holston whig leader 
Campbell laid claim to over 1,200 acres in both Hawkins 
County, Virginia and the new Washington District, Joseph 
McDowell busily added almost 2,000 in Burke County. Yet even 
the substantial holdings of the Clevelands and Campbell were
15
dwarfed by Charles McDowell's addition of 4,200 acres in Burke 
County26 and John Sevier's acquisition of 6,200 acres that 
ranged from Sullivan County deep into what is now Tennessee.27 
These addition to their previous holdings propelled the new 
whig leaders solidly into the gentry class.
Most of the land gained by the whig leaders was choice 
real estate situated along rivers and streams. Isaac Shelby 
acquired 400 acres "on the North side of the Holston River" in 
Hawkins County in 1779, almost one year after Cleveland 
established his homestead "on the North side of the Yadkin 
river and call'd by the name of the great Roundabout." 
Sevier's 1779 land claim in Sullivan County lay along the 
"North side of the Holston River," and the 640 acres he 
claimed in Green County in 1780 lay along the "South side of 
the French Broad River." Sevier later acquired a huge 3,000- 
acre tract "on the south side of the Nolachucky river" in the 
same county.28 Possession of property along waterways gave 
the new gentry access to the richest soil, simplified 
logistical problems created by their ever-growing herds of 
cattle, and afforded their owners easier transportation of 
goods to market.
Subsistence farming did not require slaves, and most 
settlers were far too poor to buy any. The presence of so 
many German Moravians at nearby Salem, who believed slavery to 
be immoral, also dampened the growth of slavery in the
29region. The backcountry gentry who comprised the whig
16
leadership were not as scrupulous as their Moravian neighbors. 
They did not have enough laborers in their families to work 
their holdings and were therefore obliged to purchase at least 
some slaves. Cleveland's 6,800 acres in 1782 were almost 
certainly not all cleared, but enough were to enable him to 
employ thirteen slaves under the age of fifty to work the land 
and to tend his large (by backcountry standards) herds of
30fifteen horses and mules and one hundred cattle.
In most cases, the pace of land acquisition far exceeded 
the ability of the owners to get the land cleared and 
indicates that most whigs accumulated land for purposes of 
patrimony, resale, or clearing at a later date, rather than 
for any immediate economic benefit. William Lenoir had 
acquired over 11,000 acres by 1782, but possessed only five 
slaves to work the land, three of whom were under the age 
seven. Wilkes County justice Benjamin Herndon owned almost
13,000 acres but only twelve slaves, five of whom were under 
seven or over fifty years old and were therefore not much help 
in the backbreaking work of clearing virgin land.51
The legal power of North Carolina's backcountry whigs 
resided most visibly in the county courts. Though the court 
met only four times a year, it wielded a great deal of power 
over the everyday lives of backcountry citizens. The court 
registered bills of sale for land, recorded livestock brands, 
granted business licenses, appointed officers to collect 
taxes, probated wills, set the maximum rates businesses could
17
charge for goods and services, saw to the care of orphans, and 
organized the upkeep of roads.32
The legislature named the court's justices on the 
recommendation of the county's elected representatives. The 
justices in turn appointed sheriffs, clerks, coroners, 
registers, and constables. To prevent abuse and corruption,
state law forbade holding more than one "lucrative office" at
. . 33any time.
North Carolina's county courts multiplied as the number 
of western counties swelled along with the backcountry's 
population during the third quarter of the eighteenth century. 
In the fall of 1777, Cleveland headed a delegation that 
appealed to the state legislature on behalf of the citizens of 
the western portion of Surry County. The petitioners pled 
that the "grievous and burthensome" journey to the county seat 
was too much to expect of loyal citizens and asked that a new
3 Acounty be created out of Surry's western districts. Their 
petition was granted and Wilkes Ccunty--named after the famous 
anti-war member of the British Parliament— was formed. As a 
reward for his lobbying efforts, Cleveland was appointed head 
of the county court and made a colonel in the county
. . . . .  35militia.
Cleveland and the other justices on the Wilkes County 
Court acted to protect whig interests and to foster order and 
stability in the increasingly volatile backcountry. The 
ideological leanings of the first Wilkes County Court are
18
evident in its composition: Cleveland and his fellow justices- 
-Charles Gordon, Benjamin Herndon, and Elisha Isaacs— not only 
had sat on the Surry County Court in the same capacity but had 
served on the county*s fervently pro-whig Committee of Public 
Safety.3J
At the court's first meeting in 1778, the members
immediately acted to assure the ideological purity of the
county officers and to protect their own interests by
appointing themselves, their kin, and their allies to fill the
various county positions. The court appointed Justices
Herndon and Gordon to the posts of entry taker and coroner,
picked Herndon's brother Joseph to be county surveyor, and
selected local Whig leader John Brown to fill the posts of
register and ranger. Cleveland got into the act by securing
the appointment of his right-hand-man William Lenoir as court 
3 7clerk. The prohibition against holding more than one office 
at the same time did not always apply as Cleveland himself 
held the offices of, at one time or another, bondsman, 
commissioner for seizing confiscated estates, superintendent 
of elections, and county ranger. He additionally sat as the 
court's presiding judge from 1778 until he left the county for
3 8South Carolina in 1785. The court and its appointed
officers carried out the day-to-day business of running the 
county in an remarkably orderly manner. While guerilla 
fighting between loyalists and whigs raged in and around 
Wilkes County, there is no indication that the routine
19
business of county governance was ever interrupted. In
addition to taxes for constructing a courthouse and prison for
the new county, the court ordered a special levy to help
support the Continental army in the Southern Department.
Those who were unable to pay due to infirmity or poverty were
granted a reprieve, as were those engaged in regular military 
39service. In the midst of the war, the court established a
committee to determine the best route for a proposed road to
link the county's settlements, and also appointed an overseer
to ensure that all eligible males did their share of the work
in its construction.40
Taxation was not the only area in which the court
affected the county's economy. The court fixed currency
standards and ordered that all bills be paid "in specie or in
North Carolina currency" at a rate of "900 to one."41 To
prevent price gouging, the court fixed prices of certain
commodities in 1778 and adjusted them from time to time as
circumstances warranted. Among the items that were regulated
were wine, rum, whiskey, beer, "Good warm lodging,"
"Warm breakfast, warm boiled or roast meat, etc.," corn, and
42"Pasturage or stableage, 24 hrs."
Regulating just rates for room and board and maintaining 
order in the midst of what amounted to a civil war were two 
very different things. The fighting that raged in and around 
Wilkes County forced the justices and their whig allies to 
take active, sometimes harsh, measures to ensure stability and
20
to uphold the whig cause.
The defeat of North Carolina’s first, large-scale 
loyalist movement at Moore's Creek Bridge in 1776 temporarily 
prevented any more colony-wide uprisings. Since neither side 
possessed a standing army, the struggle in the backcountry 
degenerated into a guerilla war characterized by ambushes, the 
murder of isolated travelers, looting, and revenge. Some 
violence Was devoid of partisan motivation: a whig officer
recorded that one roving band was not ’’connected with any 
party" but had apparently formed as "an independent company 
for the Special purpose of stealing and plundering."43
The reputations of both sides were damaged by the fact 
that most of the killing and looting was carried out by those 
who were, at least ostensibly, either tories or whigs. The 
militias of both sides "earned a notorious reputation for
<4
plundering."* One Moravian called the Revolution "a most
remarkable period, in which each morning we were glad to see
each other again, and to know that no one has suffered injury
to his person, and that neither the town nor any part of it
has been burned . . . .  [these things] did not take place by
order of those in authority nor of the army officers, but by
45mob violence of a released hungry militia." After surveying
the devastation that Carolina marauders left in their wake,
Nathanael Greene wrote that
the whigs and tories pursue one another with the 
most relentless fury killing and destroying each 
other whenever they meet. Indeed, a great part of 
this country is already laid waste and in the
21
utmost danger of becoming a desert. The great 
bodies of militia that have been in service this 
year employed against the enemy and in quelling the 
tories have almost laid waste the country and so 
corrupted the principles of the people that they 
think of nothing but plundering one another....With 
the militia, everybody is a general and the powers 
of government are so feeble that it is with the 
utmost difficulty You46 can restrain them from 
plundering one another.
Caught in the midst of this carnage, backcountry
residents bombarded the legislature with pleas for help. The
inhabitants of Surry County reported that "we are yet not
within the Protection of the laws of the State," while
Salisbury County residents applied their own situation to the
state at large by complaining that "There is Scarce the Shadow
of civil government exercised in the State."47
The legislature responded by passing several laws
designed to enhance whig control, encourage support for the
government, and punish loyalists. The first statute, passed
in March 1776, required county courts to administer the
following oath of loyalty to all citizens:*
I do solemnly and sincerely swear . . .that during 
the present unhappy contest between Great Britain 
and America, I will not under any pretence whatever 
oppose or take up Arms to oppose the Measures of 
the Continental or provincial congresses . . . nor
will I . . . advise or give Intelligence to any of
his Majesty's Governors, General Officers, Soldiers 
. I will not by example, opinion, advice or 
persuasion, endeavour to prejudice the people or 
any of them in favour of Parliamentary Measures or 
against those recommended bjj the General and 
provisional Congresses . . . .
In May 1776, the assembly moved to strengthen the power 
of local officials by ordering that local Councils of Safety
22
"be vested with full power and authority to do and execute all 
acts and things necessary for the defence and protection of 
the people of this colony." Later that month, the assembly 
moved to discourage loyal ism by ordering that "any person . .
. who shall take up arms against America . . .  or shall give 
intelligence or aid to the enemies thereof . . . shall forfeit 
all his goods, and chattels, lands, and tenements . . . and
49moreover be considered (when taken) as a prisoner of war."
Given such legal justification, Cleveland--in his roles 
as chairman of the Safety Committee, Wilkes County Court 
justice, and militia colonel--needed little encouragement to 
start hounding the region's tory population from pillar to 
post.50 He and his men assembled quickly and struck hard 
whenever they received word of a hostile gathering. They soon 
became known among loyalists as "Cleveland's Devils." Any 
tories unfortunate enough to fall into their hands were 
usually given a chance to recant. If they refused, they were 
hanged.
So zealous were Cleveland and his men in their pursuit of 
loyalists that he and fellow county official Benjamin Herndon 
were indicted for the murders of Lemuel Jones and William 
Coyle in an adjacent county. On November 6, 1779, the upper 
house of the legislature entertained a motion "that his 
excellency the Governor, be requested to grant a Pardon to 
Colonel Benjamin Cleveland, Capt. Benjamin Herndon of Wilkes 
County and others concern[ed], in Killing Lemuel Jones and
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William Coyle two known Traitors, Murderers, Robbers, and 
Horse Thieves, and for beating James Harvil who had harboured 
the same." The assembly denied the request, but the governor 
later used his own authority to pardon both of the whig 
officers.
Whether most of Cleveland's victims were really 
"Traitors, Murderers, Robbers, and Horse Thieves" or simply 
people who had the misfortune to be in the wrong place at the 
wrong time is impossible to say. Some historians have argued 
that whig leaders, prompted by an excess of zeal or simply by 
greed, waged "campaign[s] of terror" that "transformed 
neutrals into loyalists and deepened the resentments of the 
disaffected.1,52
It is certain that some of Cleveland's behavior went 
beyond the pale of even guerilla warfare and contributed to 
the sense of lawlessness that plagued the backcountry.53 The 
Moravians, who were as neutral as anyone in the region, heard 
"reports of the bad behaviour of the Liberty Men, especially 
those from Wilkes County."54 Despite the reputation for 
violence of some whig militias, there is little evidence that 
their depredations led to a sizable increase in the number of 
loyalists. The shattered tory ranks remained thin after 
Moore's Creek Bridge because of a combination of localism and 
expediency that was unique to the backcountry.
Isolated as they were from events along the coast, 
settlers tended to be more concerned with local affairs, such
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as militia musters and county court proceedings, than with
ssevents occurring at the distant statehouses. This tendency 
grew stronger as circumstances around them degenerated and 
violence became the rule of the day. By the time of its 
establishment in 1778, Wilkes County’s citizens, who 
demonstrated little concern for ideological purity in the 
first place, had experienced enough of the war's disorder, and 
like other North Carolinians, "a majority of settlers were 
inclined to support whichever side could ensure a modicum of 
stability."56 As time went on, the frontier whigs success at 
governance led more and more of the populace to view them as 
the group that could bring the local order the settlers 
sought.
The loyalist alternative held little attraction for the 
wavering. Despite their recent successes, the British army 
had a poor record in the South. Bungled attempts to take 
Charleston early in the war and the failure to prevent the 
slaughter of the tories at Moore's Creek Bridge had done 
little to enhance the Crown's reputation along the frontier as 
a reliable ally. Charleston's fall and the whig debacle at 
Camden, while welcome news, did nothing to directly help the 
beleaguered frontier loyalists. Even the king's staunchest 
supporters must have noticed that the scarlet tunics of His 
Majesty's soldiers were still absent from the frontier, recent 
British triumphs on the coast notwithstanding.
Stories of British victories at Charleston and Camden
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were in stark contrast to the wretched condition of tories in 
the mountains. Backcountry tories suffered not only from a 
dearth of leadership but, more importantly, from lack of 
protection from provincial and local whig authorities. By the 
time the tide turned against the whigs at Charleston and 
Camden, North Carolina's backcountry loyalists had been 
suffering relentless harassment for almost four years. 
British triumphs on the coast and in the piedmont did nothing 
to relieve beleaguered tories on the frontier, who continued 
to face the fury of Cleveland and his cohorts alone. In 
contrast, whigs were running the provincial and local 
governments, constructing roads and public buildings, and, 
more important, demonstrating the ability to enforce their 
laws and exact revenge on their enemies,
Despite their successes, the whigs were never able to 
wholly eradicate the tory presence in the backcountry. There 
was always a portion of the population who remained loyal to 
the king out of a sense of duty. The whigs inadvertently 
added to this by their own heavy-handed and indiscriminate 
treatment of those they even suspected were opposed to them. 
Hangings and burning homesteads created resentment among 
victims, their families, and friends. But whig governance was 
sufficiently stable, and the threat of whig retaliation so 
severe, that the neutral community generally chose to take the 
oath of loyalty to the state, pay their taxes, and mouth pro- 
whig platitudes to avoid confrontations with local
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authorities.
When Major Ferguson arrived at the edge of the mountains
and sent his threatening proclamation over their crests, it
was perhaps more a sign of frustration than an indication of
his true intentions. His efforts to rally tories to the royal
banner had been frustrated by the hesitation of the populace
to openly declare against the local whig leaders. In the
course of his march, Ferguson managed to bring in only about
57five hundred volunteers. Although there may have been more 
enlistments that were not recorded, their number was not 
significant, and Ferguson's new recruits quickly melted away 
once he began to retreat. When he was finally run to ground
at King's Mountain, Ferguson commanded virtually the same
5 3force with which he had entered North Carolina.
The victory at King's Mountain proved the deathblow to 
any hopes of large-scale loyalist activity in the North 
Carolina backcountry and was a triumph for the "Over the 
Mountain Men" in more ways than one. The destruction of 
Ferguson's force was the crowning act in a process in which 
the frontier gentry had earned positions of influence in the 
backcountry and had come to control its institutions of power. 
Their quick response in defense of those institutions against 





Benjamin Cleveland, William Campbell, and the Revolution
in Backcountry North Carolina
The contest between whigs and tories for control of the 
North Carolina and Virginia backcountry began in earnest when 
loyalist Donald McDonald raised the royal standard on February 
1, 1776. The initial response was enthusiastic— some 1,500 
loyalists rallied to the king's flag. Somewhat less 
encouraging was the fact that among them were only some 600 
firearms, including relatively worthless fowling pieces and
rfl
shotguns. Not one to be easily discouraged, McDonald
marched for the coast, planning to rendezvous with British 
regulars who were to land and reinforce him, but his plans 
miscarried when his force was intercepted about thirty miles 
from the provincial capital at Wilmington by a thousand-man 
force of whigs under Richard Caswell. Caswell's men occupied 
a strong defensive position. They had ripped up the planking 
on the single bridge that spanned the creek to their front and 
then greased the remaining framework with tallow. On February 
27, the loyalists, most of whom went into battle brandishing 
traditional highland weapons such as broadswords, claymores, 
and pikes and obligingly charged the front of the whig 
position. The attack was shattered and the loyalists were cut 
down in droves. McDonald died leading the attack, and what 
was left of his force was scattered.63 Whig partisans hounded 
the routed loyalists as they stumbled toward their homes in
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the wake of the battle.
Crushing though the defeat was, it did not bring a halt 
to loyalist resistance. Having extinguished the great 
loyalist threat, the whig leaders now found themselves faced 
with seemingly innumerable bands of tory raiders, who sprung 
up seemingly underfoot and raided all over the state. The 
whigs responded in kind, and answered the loyalists raid for 
raid and murder for murder. Both whigs and tories soon were 
locked in a spiral of small-scale but vicious guerilla 
fighting. Though many whig leaders arose who were adept at 
this kind of warfare, two of the most effective partisans were 
Benjamin Cleveland and William Campbell.
Campbell and Cleveland in many ways epitomize the leaders 
of the ’’Over the Mountain Men." Though they came from 
different backgrounds, they were similar in a number of ways. 
Both were prosperous farmers, active in local politics, and 
relentless in their efforts to convert or destroy loyalists. 
Besides playing key roles in securing the area around the 
Yadkin, Watauga, and Holston rivers for the whigs, Campbell 
and Cleveland were both major contributors to the American 
victory at the key battle of King's Mountain.
Benjamin Cleveland was born in Prince William County, 
Virginia, on May 26, 1738. He, his parents, and grandparents 
resettled in an Orange County frontier community on the Blue 
Run near Albermarle while he was still an infant. The origins 
of his parents, John and Martha Cleveland, are uncertain, but
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it is thought that they probably came from Yorkshire and 
emigrated to America sometime in the early eighteenth century 
along with Cleveland's paternal grandparents.61
Cleveland’s family was large— he had "numerous" siblings-
6 2-and Benjamin received little formal education. But like 
most children on the frontier, he did learn how to take care 
of himself at an early age. When he was still a child, some 
drunken rowdies broke into the cabin when his parents were out 
and began to destroy the family's meager possessions and knock 
holes in the walls. The twelve-year-old Benjamin seized his 
father's rifle and forced the intruders out at gunpoint.61
If the drunkards found young Benjamin to be more than 
they could handle, they were not alone. As an adult, 
Cleveland was almost six feet in height and weighed 180 pounds 
when young, though his girth increased throughout his life. 
He possessed a "thunderous" voice and became known as a 
"stranger to fear."0* He and his brothers soon earned 
notoriety for such pastimes as frequenting racetracks,
drinking, and gambling. Benjamin in particular gained a 
reputation for being "dexterous" at cards. If, in spite of 
his dexterity, Cleveland found himself losing a game, he would 
accuse his opponent of cheating, bowl him over, and "sweep the
stakes and put them into his pocket." It was no wonder that
the Cleveland boys were thought to be "very immoral."65
In spite of his questionable reputation, Cleveland 
surprised the local wags by persuading Mary Graves— the
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daughter of William Graves, a successful local planter— to 
marry him. His pursuit of pleasure had left him little money, 
and since Cleveland owned no property, he and his wife moved 
in with his father-in-law.
Although tradition has it that Mary eventually managed to 
curb Cleveland's participation in questionable pastimes, her 
early efforts met with little success.66 An example of one 
of Mary's early failures occurred when her prodding and the 
realization of his new responsibilities prompted Cleveland to 
go into a partnership with neighbor Joseph Martin to raise 
wheat along the Pig Piver in 1767. ~In spite of their 
lackluster efforts, the fields produced "something of a crop." 
As was customary, they invited some friends to help them get 
the crop in. They also invited a fiddler and brought along a 
large store of liquor to lighten the work. Their attempt at 
a harvest degenerated into a wild debauch and the wheat 
remained untouched in the fields.67
Fortunately for Cleveland, his father-in-law's work ethic 
and business sense exceeded his own. Graves's success was not 
without its costs, for as his wealth and pool of slave 
laborers grew, his land began to give out under the strain of 
annual tobacco production. Cleveland urged his father-in-law 
to move to the west and get fresh land and Graves finally 
agreed. In 1769, Cleveland, Graves, and Cleveland's brother 
Robert moved to Rowan County, North Carolina and settled along
& ft
the Roaring River tributary of the Yadkin. There, among the
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fertile coves that were nestled among the eastern slopes of 
the Blue Ridge, Cleveland finally began to assert himself as 
a provider as he and Graves's slaves worked to establish a new 
farm and raise livestock.
In addition to his work on the farm, Cleveland almost 
immediately began to hunt in the wilderness around his new 
home. As life on the farm grew more settled, he spent an 
increasing amount of time in the forests. Cleveland proved to 
be an accomplished woodsman and amassed a large sum of money, 
with little apparent effort, from the sale of pelts and furs 
in Salem and Salisbury.69 Besides netting him a handsome 
income, his hunting expeditions allowed him to familiarize 
himself with the Yadkin area and to select some choice 
property for himself. Sometime between 1769 and 1772, 
Cleveland acquired a tract of at least 1,300 acres in western 
Surry County situated along a great, yawning bend in the 
Yadkin. The farm's location prompted nearby settlers to give 
it the nickname "Roundabout," a sobriquet that Cleveland soon 
came to share because of his expanding waistline.70
The acquisition of a farm of his own did not suffice to 
keep the restless Cleveland at home. He continued to hunt 
extensively, and in 1772, drawn by rumors of rich game, he and 
four companions set out over the Cumberland Gap to try their 
luck in Kentucky. Perhaps because they realized that they 
were deep in Cherokee territory— land on which, according to 
the Proclamation of 1763, they were forbidden— Cleveland and
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his partners worked quickly. Their fears of trouble with the 
Cherokees were allayed after several Cherokee hunting parties 
stopped at their camp and seemed unbothered by the white men’s 
presence.
It was thus a rude shock when, on the morning of their 
planned departure, a large band of heavily armed warriors 
appeared at their camp. The alarm of Cleveland and his party 
grew when their usual gifts of food failed to placate their 
hosts. In the midst of this tense atmosphere, the leader of 
the Indians squatted down, made a mark in the dust with his 
finger and pointed back toward the Cumberland Gap and the 
white settlements. He then made another mark on the ground 
and followed it with a gesture that encompassed their present 
location and the mountains around them, indicating Cherokee 
lands. Then, haying let Cleveland and his friends do their 
hunting for them, the Cherokees took every one of the 
intruders' hard earned pelts, along with their horses, guns, 
and "even their hats and shoes."71 In answer to the white 
men's protests, the laughing Indians gave them a worn-out 
shotgun with enough powder for two shots and signaled for them 
to be off. Furious and humiliated, Cleveland and his 
companions gingerly began their journey back to the Yadkin. 
Though they had to endure the added humiliation of being 
forced to eat their hunting dog on the way, Cleveland and his 
footsore companions made the trek of over two hundred miles 
back to Roundabout in safety, if not comfort.72 W h e n
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tidings of the clash between colonists and British forces in 
Massachusetts reached the Yadkin in 1775, Cleveland 
immediately voiced his support for the insurgents. As North 
Carolina began to organize regiments for the conflict with 
Britain, Cleveland received a commission as an ensign in the 
regiment of Robert Howe.73 He refused the appointment and 
instead raised a militia company which he marched westward 
over the mountains to the Sycamore Shoals area to scout the 
frontier and guard against Indian attacks. They saw little 
action and in the fall Cleveland disbanded his company so that 
the men could return to their homes and harvest their crops. 
When McDonald called for backcountry loyalists to rally at 
Cross Creek in early February 1776, Cleveland once again 
organized a company and marched quickly to join Caswell's 
forces in their attempt to block tory access to Wilmington and 
the coast. According to tradition, he and his company arrived 
in the midst of the battle at Moore's Creek Bridge and then 
aided in the pursuit of the shattered tory force after the 
bat 11 e .74
Although the defeat at Moore's Creek Bridge may have 
dashed the grand plans of loyalists for cooperative operations 
with British regulars, small bands of tories soon took up the 
struggle. Throughout the backcountry, isolated whig farms 
were struck by roving bands of loyalists. The attacks were 
accompanied by much killing and looting, for the loyalists, 
remembering the recent hounding they had been subjected to,
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were eager to respond in kind. To help put down this threat 
to whig life and property, Cleveland and his company began to 
aggressively patrol the area around present-day Wake Forest, 
hunting down suspected tories and hanging several. So sudden 
and violent was Cleveland's response to any hint of tory 
activity that the cause of the king in one part of North 
Carolina never fully recovered. "I don't recollect-said one 
whig leader, "after Cleveland had done with them to have heard 
much more from those wretches during the war."75
Just as whig leaders had begun to respond to the tory 
attacks, tensions with the Cherokees to the south and west 
began to increase alarmingly. Although they had at first been 
mystified by the quarreling of the white invaders among 
themselves, the avarice of the settlers made the choice of 
allies an easy one for the Cherokees: they promptly sided
with the British. The young warriors, led by Dragging Canoe, 
were justifiably resentful of the illegal settlements over the 
1763 boundary line— including the homesteads in the Holston 
and Watauga areas— and were especially eager to take up the 
hatchet. In the spring of 1776, a delegation of Iroquois, 
Shawnee, and Delaware leaders arrived at the towns of the 
Overhill Cherokees and made an alliance that they hoped would 
allow them to drive the white interlopers back all along the 
front ier.
The British Indian commissioner for the Southern 
District, John Stuart, was reluctant to lend royal endorsement
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to the warriors' plans. He disapproved of the Indians' brutal 
form of warfare and feared that the warriors, once on the 
warpath, might roam over the boundary line and prey on loyal 
subjects.76 Turning a deaf ear to the pleas and protests of 
the area's hard-pressed loyalists, Stuart used his influence 
to diplomatically isolate the Cherokees and convinced the 
Creeks and Choctaws— who between them had almost 9,000 
warriors77— to refrain from entering the war until they 
received word from him. . Stuart's intervention forced the 
Cherokees to fight the southern settlers on their own and may 
well have saved the backcountry settlements.7*
In July 1776, large bands of Cherokee raiders struck the 
backcountry settlements from Virginia to Georgia. The 
settlers, who had been forewarned by friendly Indians, packed 
what possessions they could and fled to the s t ockades . Though 
the attackers devastated isolated farms and killed stragglers 
who had delayed seeking refuge, they were unable to destroy 
any large settlements. But as the Indians withdrew, they left 
many farms and small settlements in smoking ruins.
The outraged settlers retaliated by organizing a force of 
over six thousand men and invading the Cherokee homeland in 
three massive columns. Cleveland remembered his earlier 
humiliation at Cherokee hands and needed no encouragement to 
enlist. He quickly gathered his Surry County men and joined 
the 2,500-man central column of Griffith Rutherford who 
marched against the Middle Cherokees. The outnumbered Indians
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fell back grudgingly, skirmishing frequently but denying the
larger force a chance to destroy them in a general engagement.
The lot of their pursuers was not a pleasant one, as most of
the militia, Cleveland and the other officers included, were
"often destitute of provisions, without tents, [and] with but
few blankets."79 In spite of their logistical difficulties,
all three columns drove deeply into the Cherokee homeland
before withdrawing. The vengeful settlers razed the principal
Cherokee towns, burned the Indians' corn fields, and wrecked
whatever small villages they could find.
Upon its return, the army disbanded. Cleveland's company
returned to the Yadkin, where he reorganized it and
replenished its supplies. Cleveland then hurried his men back
to the Watauga area in order to parry the anticipated Cherokee
8 0retaliatory raids. They need not have bothered, for in May 
1777, the Cherokees, their will to resist broken by the 
destruction of their towns and crops, sued for peace. The 
treaty ending the conflict was formalized at Long Island on 
the Holston river in July. In the agreement, the defeated 
Cherokees ceded to Virginia and North Carolina all claims to 
lands east of the Blue Ridge Mountains and North of the
8 INolichucky River.
After participating in the effort to put down the first 
great loyalist threat and then helping to repulse and punish 
the Cherokees, the whigs of the western part of Surry County 
began to press for more political power in the state
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legislature. In the fall of 1777, Cleveland journeyed to the 
legislature and lobbied for the creation of a new county in 
Surry County's western half. His efforts were successful, and 
when Wilkes County was officially recognized in March 1778, he 
received his reward in the form of an appointment to the 
county court and a commission as colonel in the county
o 2
militia. Cleveland's vigor in executing his duties, which 
in his eyes consisted chiefly of hunting down loyalists, made 
him popular with the whig population in Wilkes County and 
popularity led to more political rewards. In 1778, he won a 
seat in the lower house of the legislature and in 1779 Wilkes 
County's citizens sent Cleveland to the state senate.83
Cleveland was by no means a great legislator, a fact that 
his whig constituents did not seem to greatly mind. His 
electoral victories were in effect a reward for his almost 
constant partisan warfare with the Yadkin's loyalists as a 
"most vigilant, active, and persevering partisan 
officer...being increasingly engaged in ferretting out, 
harassing and . hanging the discontented and troublesome 
Tories. " u
Much of the violence was perpetrated by those who lacked 
any political motive and were motivated by greed or a desire 
to settle old scores. Others acted from deep beliefs in the 
rights of the colonists or notions of duty toward their king. 
The third, and largest, segment of the population was 
politically ambivalent and wished to halt the violence that
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was an increasingly large part of their lives.*5 By quickly 
crushing any nascent loyalist movement growing within their 
reach, Cleveland and his associates instilled fear in the
king's supporters. Cleveland's hanging of looters and thieves 
appealed to the even larger segment of the population that 
wanted order.
Cleveland's actions as a partisan could only be described 
as harsh. His men were notorious looters and pillagers, and 
he apparently made little effort to discipline them. A 
Moravian chronicler described them as "very wild" and noted 
the "reports of the bad behavior of the Liberty Men,
especially those from Wilkes County."8*
Cleveland hated loyalists and routinely hanged them
without trial as soon as they fell into his hands. The
attitude of Cleveland and his men toward intransigent tories 
is perhaps best illustrated by his response to the pleas of a 
thirteen-year-old boy that he spare a wounded Loyalist from 
the noose. "Jimmie, my son," replied Cleveland, "he is a bad 
man; we must hang all such dangerous tories and get them out 
of their miseries."87
At times, Cleveland's passions caused him to forgo even 
the formality of a hanging. He once became so enraged at 
prisoners James Cowles and John Browne that he drew his sword 
intending to personally dispatch them for their "violation of 
the laws of God and man." Unfortunately for Cleveland, his 
violent thrust struck a button on Cowles's coat, which snapped
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the blade. Angry but undeterred, Cleveland simply had both
a 8
men hanged. On another occasion Cleveland captured two 
tories, hanged the first, and gave the second a painful 
choice: join his companion at the end of a rope or cut off
his own ears, leave the area, and never return. The tory 
asked for a whetstone to sharpen Cleveland's proffered knife
8 9and ruefully chose the latter, painful option.
Local loyalists hated the leader of "Cleveland's Devils" 
and tried to kill him on more than one occasion. Raiders 
struck Roundabout when Cleveland was absent and left burning 
ruins, scattered stock, and the body of Cleveland's overseer 
John Doss swinging from a rope as tokens of tory vengeance.58 
Loyalists spotted Cleveland's brother Larkin and, mistaking 
him for his brother, ambushed him and left him for dead. 
Friends found him lying in his blood in the midst of the road, 
barely alive.51 Such attacks only deepened Cleveland's hatred 
of loyalists and led him to step up his attacks against them.
While the king's backcountry subjects may have been 
obliged to keep their heads down, the British army was not. 
Fresh from his victory over Gates's army at Camden, Cornwallis 
marched toward North Carolina. As he moved north, Cornwallis 
detached a force composed mostly of South Carolina tories 
under Major Patrick Ferguson and ordered it west to recruit 
loyalists and to suppress the whigs who were raiding British 
outposts and ambushing patrols. Ferguson began his march on 
September 1, 1780 with a force of around 1,000 men. He moved
quickly westward, burning whig farms and scattering any 
partisans he encountered. To his chagrin, however, he 
discovered that the victories of British arms did little to 
bring region's cowed loyalists to their sovereign's flag. 
Volunteers were scarce. By September 7, Ferguson had reached 
Gilbert Town at the base of the Blue Ridge, where he made a 
fateful decision. Hoping to intimidate the whigs and embolden 
the king's brow-beaten friends, the frustrated Ferguson sent 
a message over the mountains to the Watauga settlers 
threatening that "if they did not desist from their opposition 
to the British arms, he would march his army over the 
mountains, hang their leaders, and lay their country waste 
with fire and sword."52 He resumed his drive westward into 
the edge of the Blue Ridge, though more slowly, as if he 
wanted to gauge the effect of his threat.
That threat, far from intimidating the whigs into 
paralysis, had the same effect as giving a vigorous shake to 
a hornet's nest. When Ferguson's letter arrived in the 
settlements, it produced a flurry of messages among the 
region's whig leaders. With Ferguson's force poised 
threateningly only two days' march from their hearths, Isaac 
Shelby, John Sevier, Charles McDowell, and William Campbell 
gathered as many men as they could and announced a general 
rendezvous at Sycamore Shoals.53 There, on September 25, the 
combination of their forces with those who had reached the 
shoals on their own brought the total number of men present to
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over 1,000.
The next day, Presbyterian minister Samuel Doak mounted 
a stump and delivered a lengthy prayer on behalf of the 
assembled army. Doak reminded the Lord of the iniquitous 
behavior of their enemies and enjoined his aid in the coming 
battle. He compared the looming struggle against Ferguson's 
army to the biblical contest between Gideon's three hundred 
Israelites and the hordes of Midianite invaders. Doak quoted 
Gideon:
When I blow with a trumpet, I and all that are with 
me, then blow yet the trumpets also on every side 
of all the camp and say, 'The sword of the Lord and 
Gideon.'
As the people responded with a loud "Amen," Doak repeated 
Gideon's command, then, still more loudly, he cried, "Let that 
be your battle cry: The sword of the Lord and of Gideon."
"The sword of the Lord and of Gideon" rolled back from the 
assembly in response.94 The men, many of whom had brought 
their families, now said their goodbyes and mounted their 
horses. The thousand-man force turned east toward the 
mountains, and, confident that God was on their side, started 
through the passes to destroy Ferguson's army.
Ferguson received word of their coming from two whig 
deserters and brought his westward movement to an abrupt halt. 
He reversed direction and fell back toward Gilbert Town. As 
he retreated, Ferguson tried to turn the whig advance into a 
recruiting ploy. In a last attempt at rousing the region's 
lethargic loyalists, Ferguson issued another, less bombastic
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proclamation, warning the reluctant tories that "the Back 
Water men have crossed the mountains" and then added that "if 
you wish or deserve to live, and to bear the name of men to 
grasp your arms in a moment and run to camp."95
Cleveland, too, was aware that "the Backwater Men have 
crossed the mountains" and was heading for Ferguson's camp as 
quickly as he could. The timing of Ferguson's threat and the 
whig response had found Cleveland with about 350 men from 
Surry and Wilkes Counties already in hand. His force had 
originally been raised for the purpose of yet another tory- 
hunting expedition. The enemy had heard of Cleveland's 
approach and scattered. Left thus with no target, Cleveland 
was on the verge of disbanding his men and sending them home 
when word of Ferguson's threat and the response of the Watauga 
settlers reached him. He hurried his men south, skirting the 
eastern slope of the Blue Ridge, while the other pursuers were 
■still toiling over the passes, and managed to reach Quaker 
Meadows on the Catawba River by October 1. There his men 
rendezvoused with the larger whig force from Sycamore Shoals.
Meanwhile, Ferguson was continuing to retreat toward 
Cornwallis and the British main body. He continued south as 
far as Gilbert Town and then swung to the east. Moving with 
no great haste, Ferguson finally brought his retrograde 
movement to a halt and pitched camp on King's Mountain.
King's Mountain was an imposing sight, rising some 800 
feet above the surrounding terrain with thickly wooded sides.
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The mountain's top formed a relatively clear plateau that was 
seventy yards wide at its southwest end and broadened to 200 
yards at its northeast corner. There, Ferguson made his main 
camp.96 The plateau made for a comfortable campsite, but its 
lack of cover was in stark contrast with the covered 
approaches the mountain's wooded flanks offered any attacking 
force.
Ferguson's lethargic withdrawal to so poor a defensive 
position may at first seem puzzling. King's Mountain was not 
a particularly good place to fight the kind of battle that 
Ferguson planned. Tactically speaking, the taller peaks to 
the west offered better ground for defense than King's 
Mountain's relatively gentle slopes. On the other hand, 
Ferguson, as the first official British presence in the region 
for years, could not very well run pell mell for the 
protection of the British main body at the first gleam of a 
whig rifle barrel. Perhaps he reasoned that a slow retreat 
and then a firm stand in the face of roughly equal numbers 
would stiffen the spines of the region's hesistant tories.
Another reason for his withdrawal is revealed in his 
correspondence with Cornwallis. Having drawn the whigs over 
the mountains, Ferguson hoped to combine with reinforcements 
and destroy them. Upon arriving at King's Mountain, he dashed 
off a dispatch asking Cornwallis for reinforcements. The 
message contained a plea for "Three or four hundred good 
soldiers, part dragoons," that Ferguson felt "would finish the
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business," but it was intercepted and never reached the
A 1
British commander.
Unaware of Ferguson's plans for their destruction, the 
united whig force came after him, but their pursuit was 
slowed. The men were traveling light— "each had a blanket, a 
cup, a wallet of provisions (parched corn meal mostly, mixed 
with maple syrup or sugar)"— but the race to the rendezvous at 
Sycamore Shoals and the rapid march over the mountains had 
worn out many of the horses.51 In an effort to conserve the
strength of both man and beast, the pace of the pursuit was
reduced. The addition of Cleveland's men had swelled the
pursuers' ranks to almost 1,500 men, but had also further the
complicated the question of who was to command the expedition. 
There were six colonels present but no generals, and the 
ranking officers met on October 4 to decide who was to be in 
overall command. They decided to send a message to General 
Gates who, even in the flotsam and jetsam after Camden, was 
still the titular head of the Southern Department, informing 
him of their need for a commander. In the meantime, they 
chose Colonel William Campbell, a planter from the Holston, to 
act as executive officer of the day until Gates replied.
Campbell had been born in 1745 in Augusta County, 
Virginia. His father, Charles Campbell, was a prosperous 
farmer and had been able to give young William what by
a a
frontier standards was an extensive education. The elder 
Campbell turned to drink in the 1760s and died in 1767,
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leaving William, at age twenty-two, in charge of the 
household.
Campbell promptly packed up his mother and four sisters 
and moved to the Abingdon, Virginia, area on the north fork of 
the Holston River and acquired some land. By 1773, Campbell 
had enough influence to be appointed a justice of Fincastle 
County, which embraced much of southwestern Virginia and all 
of Kentucky. The following year he accepted a commission as 
captain in the county militia. This appointment, which was 
the beginning of Campbell's official military career, 
coincided with the beginning of Lord Dunmore's War with the 
Shawnees.
The fighting was touched off by Virginia governor 
Dunmore's attempts to claim lands reserved for the Shawnees by 
the Fort Stanwix Treaty of 1768. Dunmore's land grab really 
had more to do with blocking Pennsylvania' s claims to the same 
territory than the quarrels Dunmore fabricated with the 
region's Indians. He hoped that by seizing the land from its 
unoffending inhabitants before Pennsylvania beat him to it, he 
could cement Virginia's claim to the territory.
Two invading columns, one commanded by Dunmore, the other 
by Colonel Andrew Lewis, advanced toward the Ohio River in 
September 1774 with the intention of rendezvousing at Point 
Pleasant and then driving together into the Shawnee heartland. 
Lewis arrived at Point Pleasant only to discover that Dunmore 
had unilaterally changed the rendezvous point and that his
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force would have to cross the Ohio unsupported. While the 
chagrined Lewis was still contemplating this unpleasant turn 
of affairs, the Shawnees struck. On October 10, 700 Shawnee 
warriors under the leadership of Cornstalk attacked Lewis's 
fortified camp at Point Pleasant and were repulsed only after 
a bloody battle that cost Lewis almost a third of his 
command.109
Campbell had raised a company from the Abingdon area that 
was placed under the command of a colonel named Christian. 
They did not arrive in time to march with Lewis's column and 
were forced to hurry after him. After a grueling march, they 
arrived during the waning moments of the battle. Although too 
late to aid in the battle, they did help pursue the retreating 
Indians across the Ohio.101
With Lewis’s victory and the Indians' retreat, Dunmore 
considered his aims achieved and wanted to halt the campaign. 
Before he could stop the fighting, he first had to restrain 
the militia— he was forced to personally stop Lewis at sword 
point— who were eager to press on after the defeated Indians. 
Cornstalk, on the other hand, still thought the interlopers 
could be beaten and wanted another crack at them. His people, 
however, had had enough and were anxious to sue for peace. 
Campbell and his footsore company were present at the Sciota 
Eiver on October 26, 1774, when Dunmore and Cornstalk agreed 
to a truce that pleased no one but the Virginia governor.102
The growing tensions between Britain and the colonies
47
were felt in the backcountry as well as along the coast. No 
sooner had Campbell arrived home in Abingdon than whig leaders 
in the Holston area drafted a message of solidarity for the 
Continental Congress. The message, which Campbell endorsed, 
was dated January 20, 1775, and declared to the Congress that 
if
our enemies attempt to dragoon us out of those 
inestimable privileges which we are entitled to as 
subjects...we declare that we are deliberately and 
resolutely determined never to surrender them to 
any power upon earth but at the expense of our 
lives.11”
Campbell immediately reformed his company and led it to 
Williamsburg, where it was placed in the First Virginia 
Regiment under the command of Patrick Henry. Campbell 
apparently got along well with Henry and even better with 
Henry's sister Elizabeth, whom he married in 1776 .104
Henry longed for glory on the battlefield to match his 
oratorical triumphs in the House of Burgesses and was eager to 
see action. Wiser heads, however, realized that Henry's 
abilities as a soldier were limited and kept the First 
Virginia well away from the enemy until Henry resigned in 
disgust. The regiment was then placed under the command of 
General Andrew Lewis and was part of the force that drove 
Dunmore from his toehold on Gwynn1s Island to the safety of a 
British frigate in July 1776.105
When word of the looming troubles with the Cherokees 
reached the tidewater, Campbell tried in vain to wring 
permission from his superiors to return to the Holston to help
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defend his mother and sisters. Despite his best efforts to 
obtain a release, he was not able to resign until October. So 
while the Cherokee tide crested in the mountains, then 
receded, a worried Campbell languished near the coast.106 He 
finally reached Abingdon but was too late to take part in the 
retaliatory campaign against the Cherokees.
In January 1777, three months after Campbell's return to 
Abingdon, Fincastle County was divided and Washington County 
was created as a result. Campbell accepted appointment as a 
justice in the new county's court as well as promotion to the 
rank of lieutenant colonel in the Washington County militia. 
He also undertook the responsibility of supervising the 
drawing of the new boundary line with the Cherokees. He was 
thus once again called away from his farm and family to 
supervise the surveying work for the better part of the 
year.107
From 1778 until 1780, Campbell gained a respite from his 
travels since his duties did not call him to travel far from 
home. He was not idle during this time but gained a 
reputation as a "warm and most zealous Whig" who soon became 
"especially odious" to the area's loyalists.108 While 
continuing to serve on the county court, he was very active as 
an officer in the militia. Campbell swept Washington county 
from one end to the other and much like Cleveland, sought to 
quickly quash any tory bands before they had a chance to grow.
But, in contrast to Cleveland, Campbell disciplined his
men and did not allow them to indiscriminately loot civilians. 
While among the pacifistic Moravians of Salem, Campbell and 
his men "behaved in an orderly manner" and paid fair prices 
for any supplies they took. Campbell not only kept a tight 
rein on his own men but gave an "emphatic warning" to a party 
of Wilkes County men to leave the Moravians in peace. He was, 
recorded a grateful Moravian chronicler, "solicitous that no 
harm should befall us."109 Despite his zeal, Campbell does
not seem to have been inordinately harsh in his position as 
judge, though he did dispense summary justice when he felt it 
necessary. In May 1779, he ordered a loyalist named Francis 
Hopkins to pay a heavy fine and sentenced him to six months in 
jail. Since the new county's prison was still under 
construction, Hopkins was released on his own recognizance 
with the understanding that he would report when it was 
finished. Hopkins emphasized the need for a jail by
predictably failing to report. He was immediately suspected 
when placards began to appear around Campbell's property 
threatening Campbell and his family.
While returning home from church one Sunday, Campbell
spotted a rider in the distance whom he believed to be
Hopkins. He rode briskly toward the figure, who immediately 
wheeled his mount and fled. It was indeed Hopkins, and when 
he reached the Holston, he jumped his horse off a fifteen- 
foot embankment into the water. Campbell, who by that time 
was hard on his heels, followed him in. The two struggled
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desperately in the water for some time before a group of 
Campbell’s friends arrived. Together they dragged the gasping 
fugitive to the bank and immediately hanged him from one of 
the trees along the river.,IJ
News of the pursuit and Hopkins' summary execution served 
notice that Campbell was not a man to be trifled with. His 
reputation for zeal in suppressing tories soon spread 
throughout the state. Some of his activities prompted the 
Virginia legislature to pass a special act in October 1779 
absolving Campbell and several others of responsibility for 
deeds they committed that, although justified by 
circumstances, were not "strictly warranted by law."111
The year 1780, the most important in Campbell's life, 
began with his promotion to colonel in April. After serving 
briefly in the lower house of the legislature in Williamsburg, 
he asked for and received permission to join an expedition 
against the Chickamauga Indians in June.112
The Chickamaugas were stalwart Cherokees who had refused 
to accept the Long Island treaty of 1777. Rather than submit, 
they had moved south under the leadership of Dragging Canoe 
and settled around Chickamauga Creek off the Tennessee River. 
Acting in conjunction with militia units from the Carolinas, 
Campbell's Virginia contingent succeeded in burning eleven 
Chickamauga towns, though the elusive Indians once again 
refused to be drawn into a major battle. The elusive Dragging 
Canoe and his warriors, now burning with more hatred for the
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whites than ever, slipped away to fight another day.113
Like Cleveland, Campbell frequently attacked and 
scattered newly forming concentrations of loyalists. One of 
his targets was a force allegedly gathering at Round Meadows. 
In a July 12 letter, he described his search for the tories,
that, according to Campbell’s informants, numbered some 200 
men. As Campbell's men rode through the neighboring 
settlements, they found no one but women, children, leading 
Campbell to conclude that the force ahead of him was large and 
that it was mostly composed of men from these communities. 
Campbell's scouts located the enemy camp, but as the whigs 
advanced the loyalists scattered and vanished in a thick 
mountain fog. A chagrined Campbell wrote that he "had not the 
fortune to find any but one of them, who was immediately 
shot."m  Despite his failure to capture or kill more of the 
enemy, Campbell had succeeded in breaking them up and 
preventing them from taking any concerted action. When he 
returned home, he was once again called away, this time to 
command a regiment of Virginia continentals. The bone-weary 
Campbell respectfully declined, citing "the domestic affairs 
calling for my attention at this time, as I have entirely 
neglected them."115
One of the domestic affairs with which Campbell busied 
himself was gathering a force to meet Cornwallis' advance to 
the Virginia border. The loss of Charleston coupled with 
Gates's defeat at Camden had so shocked and demoralized the
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area's whigs that Campbell began planning what he could do to 
help defend Virginia while Cornwallis was still in South
Carolina. When Isaac Shelby sent word of Ferguson's threats
and asked for assistance, Campbell at first declined, replying 
that he intended to await Cornwallis's advance in Virginia. 
Shelby was "much disappointed" and wrote Campbell again, 
citing "additional reasons for him to join us;1,111
Shelby may have reminded Campbell that without his 
Washington County men, there would not be enough troops both 
to deal with Ferguson and to protect the settlements from 
Dragging Canoe's warriors, who were doubtless bent on
vengeance for their ruined crops and villages. And if
Ferguson's force were eliminated, the possibility existed that 
Cornwallis might be forced to delay, or even cancel his 
invasion of Virginia.117 Whatever Shelby's arguments were, 
Campbell saw the wisdom in them and hurried to the rendezvous 
at Sycamore Shoals. He arrived on September 25 with 400 men, 
boosting the total strength of the whig force to over 1,000.
With the Reverend Doak's martial prayer still ringing in 
their ears, the army coiled southeast through Gillespie Gap 
and emerged onto the piedmont. After meeting and absorbing 
the hard-marching men under Cleveland at the forks of the 
Catawba, the army, now swelled to almost 1,500, picked up 
Ferguson's trail and swung south to Gilbert Town. There on 
October 4, Campbell was chosen to command the combined force. 
After a brief rest the army went into motion again, now
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angling southeast toward Hannah's Cowpens.
As Campbell and the other leaders well knew, time was 
becoming increasingly important. As the days of the chase 
mounted, so did the chance that the retreating Ferguson would 
be reinforced— perhaps by the hated and feared British cavalry 
officer Banastre Tarleton and his Legion— and the pursuers 
would become the pursued. On October 6, after a brief pause 
to rest and feast on "liberated" tory cattle and corn, 
Campbell ordered both those on foot and those whose mounts had 
played out to remain behind at the Cowpens and follow along as
| | g
best they could when they had recovered their strength.
The approximately 900 remaining men pushed on throughout 
the night. Nature seemed to side with the Ferguson, for no 
sooner had the streamlined army left the Cowpens than the 
heavens opened and delivered a soaking downpour that forced 
the pursuers to remove their shirts and wrap them around their 
rifles to keep the flints dry.119 By the morning of October 
7, Campbell decided to call a rest, for it was evident that 
the cold, barebacked men and tired horses could not keep going 
much longer. When informed of Campbell's decision, Isaac 
Shelby swore that though the rest of the army halt, he himself 
would "not stop until night, if I follow Ferguson into 
Cornwallis' lines."120 Their resolve stiffened by Shelby's 
example, the exhausted men pressed on.
By noon of the 7th, the rain halted and the sun broke up 
the threatening clouds. As the sun's rays warmed the whigs1
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cold and stiff bodies, their scouts returned with the welcome 
news that Ferguson was camped on King's Mountain, only eight 
miles ahead. Reinvigorated by the knowledge that their 
exhausting ordeal was almost over, the army surged forward. 
By mid-afternoon, they reached the mountain.
The whigs dismounted and left their horses under the care 
of a small force. While the men secured their loose equipment 
and reprimed their rifles for battle, Campbell quickly 
conferred with the other officers and divided the force into 
six roughly equal regiments, each under the command of one of
the army's colonels. The regiments quietly surrounded the
mountain— here they were aided by the rain-sodden ground that 
dampened the sound of their movement— and cautiously began to 
pick their way up its steep sides on foot.
As the whigs began their ascent, Ferguson's adjutant 
Alexander Chesney had just returned from an inspection of the 
sentries along the mountain's slopes. As he dismounted and 
reported to Ferguson that "all was quiet and the pickets on
the alert," the quiet afternoon air was broken by the crash of
musketry.121 The tories had finally spotted the mass of 
whigs as they moved through the trees. The startled sentries 
cried out an alarm, fired a scattered volley at their oncoming 
foes, and fled for the crest.
With the silence shattered and all hope of stealth gone, 
Campbell waved his coat over his head and led his division up 
the slope, yelling to his men to "shout like hell and fight
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like devils."122 In response to the yells from Campbell's 
regiment, whig war whoops and cries of "Buford!" arose on all 
sides of Ferguson's suddenly beleaguered force.m
If Ferguson considered a retreat, he quickly abandoned 
the idea as impractical. A withdrawal would mean the 
abandonment of the camp and its valuable supplies. The 
loyalists had no choice but to stand and fight. The rattle of 
drums from the crest answered the war cries of the oncoming 
whigs. Chesney "immediately paraded the men and posted the 
officers." Rising above the din of the drums and the whigs' 
battle cries was the shrill, piercing call of Ferguson's 
personal signal— a silver whistle.
Ferguson quickly deployed his men around the crest of 
the mountain, placing almost his entire strength along the 
tree line that bordered the plateau. The only exception was 
100 green-coated provincials from New York that he planned to 
use as a mobile reserve. Because of a wound in his right 
hand, Ferguson gripped his saber in his left and brandished it 
as he galloped along the line, blowing on his whistle to 
encourage his men.
As the whigs worked their way up the mountain, the 
defenders commenced a heavy fire. It was then that the 
shortcomings of King's Mountain as a place for defense began 
to manifest themselves. Although Ferguson's position seemed 
strong, the mountain's slopes actually worked against the 
loyalists by causing many of them to aim high and overshoot
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their targets. "The shot of the enemy," recalled whig James 
Collins, "soon began to pass over us like hail. Their great 
elevation above us had proved their ruin; they overshot us 
altogether."12* The mountain's tree-covered slopes also 
bedeviled the tories' efforts to halt the whig advance by 
offering the attackers shelter from the repeated volleys fired 
by the frustrated defenders. Whig Thomas Young "stood behind 
one tree and fired until the bark was nearly all knocked off 
and my eyes pretty well filled with it."125 Chesney later 
recalled with regret that the mountain's trees "sheltered the 
Americans and enabled them to fight in their favorite 
manner....They were able to advance in...perfect safety to the 
crest of the hill and opened an irregular but destructive fire 
from behind trees and other cover."12*
Ferguson had trained his force to fight in the accepted 
British manner. British military doctrine was based first on
disciplined, massed volley-fire from troops deployed in a line
\
of battle. That the fire be accurate was not greatly 
important— the word "aim" did not appear in the British manual 
of arms and the venerable Brown Bess musket lacked a rear
127sight. When the crashing volleys had thoroughly shaken 
the enemy, the British infantry charged home with the bayonet, 
the real arbiter of the outcome. Most officers agreed with 
Sir John Burgoyne, who emphasized the importance of creating 
"in the men's minds a reliance on the bayonet. Men of half 
their bodily strength and even cowards may be their match in
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firing; but the onset of bayonets in the hands of the valiant 
is irresistible."m  Their ranks thinned and their morale 
shattered, the enemy could be expected to break and flee the 
field. At King's Mountain, however, the mountain's sloping 
sides and the natural cover they afforded the attackers 
combined to thwart both the musketry and bayonets of the 
loyali s ts.
The whigs, fighting in "Indian manner," sprinted from 
tree to tree and almost gained the crest. As they drew 
closer, their fire grew more galling. Their musketry having 
failed them, Ferguson's men fixed bayonets— -including some 
wooden-handied "plug" bayonets that were mounted in the musket 
barrel itself— and hurled themselves down to force the whigs 
back by hand. The frontiersmen, who had no bayonets and were 
in a loose formation with little weight, could not stand 
before the tory counterattacks. The whig response to each 
loyalist charge was a hasty retreat down the slopes.
The force of each charge gradually dissipated as the 
loyalist line, hindered by trees and undergrowth, began to 
lose its cohesion and unravel. Ferguson's whistle sounded 
repeatedly above the din, and each time they heard it, the 
charging tories would scramble back to the mountain's crest. 
As they did so, Campbell and the other whig leaders rallied 
their men, who then subjected the loyalists to a withering 
fire as they retired to the tree line along the plateau. The 
whigs then resumed their advance up the mountain, sometimes
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almost on the heels of the defenders.
As whig pressure on the mountain’s narrow southwestern 
end increased, the tory line there began to buckle 
dangerously. Ferguson rushed reinforcements from his reserve 
to strengthen his collapsing flank, but the whigs were by now 
so near the crest that the green-jacketed provincials were
decimated while traversing the -mountain's crest. Soon, the 
pressure became too great and the sagging tory line on the
mountain's southwestern end collapsed completely. The fleeing
defenders were followed within moments by the whooping men of
Shelby, Campbell and John Sevier, who surged onto the mountain
top and poured a devastating fire into the backs of the other
defenders. They then began to push the hard-pressed loyalists
back toward their camp on the mountain's northeast corner.
With his entire perimeter on the verge of disintegration, 
Ferguson saw that his only hope of avoiding an ignomious 
surrender was to break out. He ordered his men with horses to 
mount for an escape. A few tried, but the rest refused for 
"as quick as they were mounted they were taken [shot] 
down."129 Ferguson managed to gather three or four men with 
horses and together they made a dash down the mountain's 
southeastern slope. Forsaking any attempt at a stealthy exit, 
Ferguson spurred off the plateau waving his sabre and blowing 
his whistle. He was— not surprisingly— recognized almost 
immediately, and cries of "There's Ferguson, shoot him!" arose 
on all sides. Flourishing his sword and sti 11 blowing on his
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whistle, Ferguson went down in a crash of rifle fire after 
being hit at least eight times. With their commander's fall, 
the failing spirits of his men collapsed completely and white 
flags began to appear on halberds and muskets in the tory 
ranks.130
Though the tories gradually ceased firing, the confusion
of the battle and the hatred engendered in the past months'
bitter warfare caused many whigs to keep firing into the
milling tories. Cries for mercy were answered by shouts of
"Tarleton's Quarter" and "Buford" and were punctuated by rifle
shots from enraged whigs. As Isaac Shelby put it:
It was some time before a complete cessation of 
firing on our part could be effected. Our men, who 
had been scattered in the battle, were continually 
coming up [over the crest] and continued to fire 
without comprehending in the heat of the moment 
what had happened; and some who had heard that at 
Buford's defeat the British had refused quarter to 
many who asked it, were willing to follow that bad 
example.131
The horrified Campbell rushed along the front ranks of 
his men, knocking down rifles and crying, "Cease firing— for 
God's sake, cease firing!" Some of the tories decided that to 
die fighting would be preferable to being shot like fish in a 
barrel and picked up their arms to renew the struggle but were 
dissuaded by Isaac Shelby, who, thundering up on horseback 
almost into the ranks of the frightened loyalists, bellowed, 
"Damn you, if you want quarters, throw down your arms!"132 
Shelby's intervention and Campbell's efforts to restrain his 
men caused the firing to die away. Soon the only sounds on
60
the mountain were the clatter of tory muskets falling to earth 
mingled with the moans of the wounded.
As the weary but exultant victors began to round up their 
prisoners, a small loyalist foraging party that had been 
observing the action from a distance was sighted at the 
mountain's base. Someone among tiie foragers or the body of 
prisoners opened fired on the celebrating whigs. Campbell 
feared that the foragers were the vanguard of a relief force 
from Cornwallis and ordered his men to open fire into the 
huddled mass of disarmed loyalists. The still-smoldering 
whigs willingly complied. By the time that he realized his 
mistake and managed once again to halt the shooting, more than 
one hundred loyalists had fallen. Deeply ashamed of his 
misjudgment, Campbell later confided to Isaac Shelby that "I 
can not account for my conduct in the latter part of the 
act ion. "133
Campbell soon found himself as busy after the fight as he 
had been during it. The dead were piled into hastily dug 
graves or covered with dead wood and rocks.134 The wounded 
also had to be cared for, and some provision had to be made 
for the prisoners. The latter task was perhaps the most 
difficult. Scarcely had the firing died down for the last 
time when a group of South Carolina whigs spied among the 
prisoners some loyalists with whom they had a quarrel. They 
clamored for the lives of the prisoners as revenge for "Tory 
barbarity."135 Campbell, by alternately cajoling and
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threatening, managed to save the prisoners' lives, if not
%
their personal belongings— "All our baggage taken, of course," 
complained Lieutenant Anthony Allaire in his diary.136
Although he had won a great victory, Campbell feared to 
linger in the area lest the much-feared Tarleton descend upon 
his force while they were encumbered with prisoners. However 
great his concern, Campbell decided that the exhausted whigs 
could not march that day. Thus both victors and vanquished 
"passed the night on the spot. . . amids t the dead and the groans 
of the dying."137 The whigs roused their prisoners early the 
following day and marched for the safety of the mountains as 
fast as their tired mounts and long train of captives allowed. 
As they toiled along, with many anxious looks over their 
shoulders for signs of pursuit, their mood darkened. Memories 
of real and imagined tory depredations began to turn in their 
minds, and they began to physically abuse, and in some cases 
kill, the prisoners. Campbell found himself doubling up and 
down the column in a vain effort to "restrain the disorderly 
manner of slaughtering and disturbing the prisoners." The 
infuriated Campbel I threatened "such effectual punishment...as 
will put a stop to it,"138
Most of the whigs simply ignored Campbell's impotent 
threatenings, and the abuse of the prisoners continued 
unabated. In a desperate effort to halt the indiscriminate 
killing, Campbell convened a court martial at Gilbert Town to 
satiate the whigs' bloodthirst. Thirty-two loyalists were
tried and convicted of various crimes by what a tory observer 
called "an infamous mock jury."m  Nine loyalist leaders 
were sentenced to be hanged. They met their deaths with 
defiant courage-— "like Romans" according to tory lieutenant 
Allaire— and "with their latest breaths expressed their 
unutterable detestation of the Rebels... and extolled their 
King and British Government."H0 The hangings seemed to 
satisfy even the most -bloodthirsty of the whigs, and the 
prisoners were molested little thereafter. Within a few days, 
the whig column was winding its way back over the mountain 
passes. As the end of the column entered the shelter of the 
hills, Campbell and the leaders could breathe easily: the
danger of pursuit from Tarleton was gone.
As news of the whig victory spread, the backcountry was 
momentarily quiet as people heard and digested the news. "It 
seemed like a calm after a heavy storm," wrote sixteen-year- 
old James Collins, "and for a short time every man could visit 
his home, or his neighbor without being afraid."m
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Epilogue
The military role of North Carolina's backcountry whigs 
after King's Mountain was comparatively minor. Some of their 
officers recrossed the mountains and fought with Greene, but 
never again did they campaign against the tories en masse as 
they had in 1780. After the defeat of the Cherokees and the 
victories over tory forces at Moore’s Creek Bridge and King's 
Mountain, the major threats to whig authority in the North 
Carolina backcountry were eliminated. Yet the fighting in 
the backcountry continued. Whigs intent on solidifying their 
control were met by stubborn loyalists who refused to quit the 
struggle. Despite the tories' efforts, the initiative shifted 
irrevocably to the whigs. Years of fighting had simply worn 
North Carolina's tories down. They had suffered casualties 
and harassment, lost their property, and been hounded 
throughout the state. They had endured all this with scant 
help from the crown, a fact not lost on the region's neutral 
population. Although they enjoyed a number of small successes 
after King’s Mountain, such as David Fanning's capture of 
Governor Burke, the region's tories lost whatever active 
support from North Carolina's large neutral population they 
had once enjoyed. By early 1781, tory fortunes had sunk so 
low that they never again posed a serious threat to whig 
author i ty.142
The role of the whig gentry in defeating the tory threat 
in the backcountry was central. They organized the military
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response both to Ferguson's raid and the numerous smaller tory 
raids that preceded it, and they provided effective leadership 
in the field. They also established and maintained local 
governmental institutions that created a modicum of order on 
the frontier, and offered the neutral population a viable 
alternative to government under the crown.
Although the whig gentry of the backcountry clearly won 
the military and political struggle to exert control over the 
region, their right to claim a moral victory is less certain. 
The citizens of North Carolina's backcountry had the 
misfortune to live.through a conflict that was both a- civil 
war and a guerilla war. Much of the fighting was sharp, 
brutish, and savage, leaving outsiders like Nathanael Greene 
appalled.143 Both tories and whigs were guilty of atrocities, 
and, as is often the case in such conflicts, it is impossible 
to determine which side began the cycle of violence. The 
inability to affix initial fault, however, does not excuse the 
looting of property and murder of prisoners that frequently 
accompanied whig operations. If the backcountry gentry are to 
receive credit for their military victories, they must also 
receive censure for the manner in which many of their 
victories were won. The importance of the whig victory at 
King's Mountain went far beyond winning the struggle in the 
backcountry. The broader ramifications of Ferguson's 
annihilation were immediately apparent to Sir Henry Clinton in 
New York:
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The instant I heard of Ferguson's defeat, I fore-saw most 
of the consequences of it....It so encouraged the spirit 
of rebellion in both Carolinas that it never could be 
afterwards h u m b l e d [ I . t ]  unhappily proved the first 
link in a chain of evils that followed each other in 
regular succession until they at last ended in the loss 
of America.144
The eradication of his left wing at King's Mountain was 
a rude shock to Cornwallis. However, he still outnumbered 
Greene, who had only recently arrived to take command from 
Horatio Gates. Cornwallis's shock turned to glee when his 
already outnumbered foes violated conventional military wisdom 
by dividing their force into two wings, the second one under 
the command of General Daniel Morgan. His Lordship 
immediately ordered his formidable cavalry commander, Banastre 
Tarleton, to go after Morgan and "push him to the utmost."145
Push him Tarleton did, and when he caught up with Morgan 
on January 17, 1781, at the same Cowpens at which Campbell's 
men had recently rested from their pursuit of Ferguson, he 
confidently ordered a frontal attack against Morgan's mixed 
force of militia and continental infantry. Morgan deployed 
his men with great skill and in his battle plan took care not 
to ask too much of the green militia. When the militia fired 
the three volleys that Morgan requested of them and withdrew, 
Tarleton believed that the Americans were retreating and 
ordered a general advance. His men surged forward headlong 
into the rock-solid ranks of the continentals. The militia 
re-formed behind the protective screen provided by the 
continentals' stand and, along with William Washington's
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cavalry, fell on Tarleton's flanks. Almost the whole British 
force were killed or captured. Tarleton himself barely 
escaped with Washington's horsemen hard on his heels. King's 
Mountain had been bad enough, but the disaster at Cowpens 
prompted Cornwallis to confide to Lord Rawdon that "the late 
affair has almost broke my heart."146
Badly in need of a victory to bolster sagging British 
fortunes, Cornwallis tried in vain to force a battle with 
Greene. Greene, however, refused to risk the existence of his 
army in a pitched battle and instead fought a brilliant 
campaign of maneuver. In desperation, Cornwallis burned his 
supply wagons in an effort to speed his march to corner his 
elusive foe. Having bled his army white in a fruitless 
pursuit, Cornwallis finally abandoned the chase in the 
Carolinas and moved to the Chesapeake to rest and refit his 
battered army. His immediate, and final, destination was a 
small Virginia port called Yorktown.
Benjamin Cleveland outlived all tory efforts to kill him. 
Not long after the war ended, he left the holdings at Old 
Roundabout for which he had fought so diligently and resettled 
in western South Carolina on the Tugalo River. He continued 
his career as a jurist and grew ever larger until at 450 
pounds he was too fat to mount a horse. He died, fittingly, 
at the breakfast table in October 1806, in the sixty-ninth 
year of his life.147
William Campbell was promoted to the rank of general and
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served with Lafayette in Virginia. There he became ill and 
was taken to the home of his sister-in-law in Hanover County. 
On August 22, 1781, less than one year after he stood
triumphantly on the crest of King 1s Mountain, William Campbell 
died at thirty-six.u*
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